Table of Contents
            Life Outside The Firewall 
        Guidelines for Systems Which Have To Protect Themselves 
        1. Do the Obvious Things 
        Turn off extra TCP and UDP services 
        TCP/IP Services Come Through Two Paths 
        Rules for Services 
        Log Access to Services 
        Logs Are Useless Unless You Use Them 
        Synchronize Clocks with a Global Time Source 
        NTP is an inexpensive alternative 
        NTP Model 
        Typical site NTP configuration 
        Only Talk To Your Friends 
        2. Never Trust The Untrusted 
        Relay systems can be an exception 
        Relay systems can still be a problem! 
        NFS is not allowed outside the firewall 
        Stateless protocols are harder to secure 
        3. Don’t Fiddle With Your Firewall 
        Hint: If you have services on your firewall, you’ll need to fiddle... 
        Firewall Anecdote 
        4. Everything Gets Its Own Box 
        DNS is a special case 
        Logging is another special case 
        5. Never Use IP-based Authentication 
        “r” Services authentication 
        That’s great except... 
        PPT Slide 
        http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/swlodin/cmad/report.html 
        6. Use Kerberos and One-Time Passwords to Log In 
        Authentication methods and their flaws 
        Use Kerberos instead of Rshell/Rlogin/Telnet 
        Obtaining a Ticket 
        Network-wide login 
        Kerberos Security 
        Initial configuration is simple 
        Example of Kerberos in LAN/WAN environment 
        Kerberos Details (for the curious) 
        Kerberos details 2 
        Kerberos details 3 
        Kerberos details 4 
        There are three kinds of OTPs 
        Time-synchronized 
        Challenge/Response   
        One-Time Pad 
        7. Denial-of-Service Attacks are Hard to Protect Against 
        PPT Slide 
        SYN attacks allocate resources by making half-open connections 
        Denial of Service Attacks Use Resources 
        Simple steps to avoiding a DoS attack 
        Tweak TCP/IP to break down dead connections quickly 
        Allocate resources to absorb a low-level SYN attack 
        For socket-based applications, look for listen() call 
        8. You Only Trust What You Know 
        DNS can be fooled 
        PPT Slide 
        You can’t trust stacks 
        Last week’s bug (ᡖ known!) 
        and you definitely cannot trust Microsoft 
        9. Don’t Be Afraid To Say “No.” 
        Your threats are unexpected 
        Life Outside The Firewall 
    |